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Executive Summary
A number of countries used discriminatory government procurement policies as part of stimulus packages designed to alleviate the effects of the global economic crisis. The re-emergence of these policies has caught the attention of trade policy makers and highlighted gaps in the evidence base needed for policy decisions. Government procurement information at the global level is sparse. There is a lack of statistics related to the size of procurement markets, the flows of trade in procurement, and the types of discriminatory procurement measures implemented by governments. This paper is the first part of an OECD project to fill some of these evidence gaps; it collates and updates the evidence related to the size of procurement markets, the level of home bias they exhibit, and the effectiveness of multilateral and bilateral procurement agreements in reducing that bias. Creation of a taxonomy of measures affecting government procurement represents the second part of the project.
The size of government procurement markets is estimated to be between, on average, 11% and 12% of GDP in 2011, based on a sample of 89 countries (not including the People's Republic of China).
Government procurement expenditure appears to be increasing both in terms of value and share of GDP. The share of procurement in GDP has been increasing gradually since 1995 with clear spikes during 2000-2002 and 2008-2010 , the latter in response to the global economic crisis.
The analysis presents evidence of domestic bias in government procurement markets, bias which has been increasing over recent years. Home-biased procurement is more pronounced in developed economies, though procurement in developing economies has become increasingly more home-biased since 2000.
The analysis in this paper suggests that the results of international efforts to address home bias in government procurement have been mixed to date. The World Trade Organisation's Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) is found to reduce discrimination in procurement markets, although available --but limited --evidence does not indicate a significant effect for bilateral agreements. The results on the impact of bilateral agreements could reflect a low level of coverage within those agreements, or the fact that they do not go beyond access already granted through other agreements such as the GPA. The evidence suggests that signing the GPA increases trade in procurement among signatories, but not necessarily overall procurement trade.
Liberalisation of investment barriers undertaken in parallel with trade agreements increases the ability of those agreements to reduce discrimination. The effect of the GPA in reducing home bias is strengthened in economies with low barriers to FDI, or which are also signatories to trade agreements that include investment provisions. This suggests that countries negotiating procurement agreements could also benefit from negotiating investment agreements in parallel.
Introduction
In the face of falling tariffs, behind-the-border measures have become increasingly important barriers to economic integration. Policies providing preferences for domestic over foreign firms in government procurement are one such example. Home-biased government procurement is widely believed to be a pervasive phenomenon (Brülhart and Trionfetti 2004; Shingal, 2015) . More recently, in response to the global economic crisis, governments have increased the use of home bias in procurement policies to avoid, inter alia, leakages from their fiscal stimulus packages (OECD, 2013) . The re-emergence of these policies has caught the attention of international trade policy makers and highlighted gaps in the evidence base.
There is a lack of reliable information, at the global level, about government procurement markets and the policies that govern them. Few statistics are widely available to understand the size of procurement markets, the flows of trade in procurement, and the types of discriminatory procurement measures that governments choose to implement.
1 There is therefore, uncertainty, not only about the size of procurement markets, but also the degree to which governments actually discriminate in their own markets. Finally, uncertainty about the scale of discriminatory procurement creates difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of international agreements in reducing that home bias. This paper aims to collect all available information, drawing on current methods, based on indirect estimation methods, to give an updated picture of the size of government procurement, to define what can be considered as "contestable" procurement and to look at the trend in size of procurement markets since the mid-nineties. The study also looks at the available evidence of discrimination and the efficiency of government procurement agreements in reducing levels of discrimination. The paper begins by providing some context to government procurement, before updating each aspect of the evidence base in turn. While the paper draws upon all available evidence, it should be noted that there is still a dearth of reliable data in this area (China, for example, is not included in this study due to the absence of data), and this caveat should be borne in mind in interpreting the paper's conclusions.
1.

Contextualising government procurement
Government expenditure can be considerable, with a significant share spent on social policies and redistribution (e.g. transfer payments). A large share is also spent on products that are used as inputs to produce public goods and services -education, defence, utilities, infrastructure, public health, and so forth. In 2013 OECD governments spent on average 28.4% of the total general government expenditure on public procurement (OECD, 2015) , and the public procurement market amounts to 10-15% of GDP in developed countries. This level of spending suggests that governments can exert significant influence on the outcomes of markets in their country by means of public procurement. Typically, government procurement policies are made up of procedures and rules which government entities must follow in order to meet the objectives of their procurement spending, while minimising the costs to taxpayers. Efficiency is important in this policy area, as it is often claimed that an overarching goal of procurement policies is "value for money."
The objectives underlying discriminatory procurement can vary, but tend to be based on economic development, social and national security grounds (Evenett and Hoekman, 2005) . Whether these policies are the most efficient at meeting their stated policy goal is an important question to investigate. There are a number of theoretical circumstances where discriminatory policies could potentially improve national welfare, although actual evidence is rare (Evenett and Hoekman, 2005) . Empirical analysis suggests that welfare gains from discriminatory procurement are modest at best, with increased domestic profits offset by higher procurement costs (Deltas and Evenett, 1997) and that discriminatory procurement is more likely to be welfare reducing (Evenett and Hoekman, 2005) . Overall, a main explanation for preferences is that they generate large increases in domestic firms' profits, creating a strong incentive for these firms to lobby for the maintenance of preferences (Deltas and Evenett, 1997) .
Governments can favour their own industry through explicit or implicit discrimination. A variety of policies can be used to explicitly discriminate against foreign suppliers, with "preferential price margin" and "domestic content requirements" being two common approaches (Ssennoga, 2006) . Domestic content requirements require procurement to be sourced locally, while preferential margins provide domestic firms with a specific level of preference.
Implicit discrimination occurs even though biases may not be formalised through legislation, regulation or government policy. The explicit exclusion of foreign firms is rare, but commonly occurs de facto. Tendering processes with no explicit discrimination may not guarantee fair treatment of foreign firms, as the discriminatory behaviour may be left unstated (Trionfetti, 2000) . For example, limitations on electronic submission and acceptance of bids to documents containing electronic signatures, while on the face of it non-discriminatory, could have a de facto discriminatory effect in the absence of reciprocal recognition of the validity of e-signature tools.
Such discriminatory procurement policies and practices constitute a barrier to trade and international competition. These barriers can be prohibitive when they take the form of bans on foreign producers, or can be similar to a tariff when a preferential margin is used. Some of the policies are similar to barriers to specific modes of services trade, for instance, discrimination may occur against foreign firms even if they have established a commercial presence in the country through direct investment (Evenett and Hoekman, 2013) . Facilitating market access has generally been the main reason for negotiating disciplines on government-procurement policy in international trade agreements (Hoekman, 2015) Efforts to open public procurement markets are not new. As the potential inefficiencies imposed by preference regimes have become more understood, countries have negotiated agreements in order to address the situation (Fronk, 2015b) . At the multilateral level, procurement was brought into the Tokyo Round of Trade Negotiations under the GATT in 1976 and resulted in the first agreement on government procurement (the "Tokyo Round Code on Government Procurement"), signed in 1979. Parties to the agreement then held negotiations to extend the scope and coverage of the agreement in parallel with the Uruguay Round. Growing recognition of the importance of eliminating discriminatory procurement policies led the Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to negotiate the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), an agreement intended to eliminate preferential treatment of national suppliers in covered procurement deals (Garcia-Alonso and Levine, 2008).
The GPA was signed in 1994, and entered into force in 1996. It regulates public tenders with a view to guaranteeing the transparency of procedures and to ensure equal treatment of domestic and foreign suppliers. The GPA was successfully renegotiated and a revised agreement entered into force in 2014. The revised GPA increased the level of market access available under the agreement by adding new entities to its scope and by expanding its coverage to new service sectors and other areas of public procurement activities, and by reducing the number of miscellaneous restrictions on market access that were previously applied. However, the GPA is a plurilateral agreement and its rules apply only to those WTO Members that have agreed to abide by them and only to the extent that they have made market commitments under the agreement.
Countries are also increasingly including disciplines on government procurement in their bilateral and regional free trade agreements. In 1990, only seven international trade agreement included provisions regarding government procurement; by 2010, this number had grown to at least seventy, comprising over fifty signatory countries. These numbers have risen further since 2010 and now include over 80 WTO Members (Anderson, Muller and Pelletier, 2016) . Most procurement agreements of this kind exist as chapters in bilateral free trade agreements and are heterogeneous in entity coverage, threshold and coverage for goods and services.
2.
What is the size of the Public Procurement market?
Countries rarely publish procurement statistics, which makes analysis reliant on estimates. Trionfetti (2000) estimates the procurement market for nine OECD countries and arrives at two different value ranges depending on the data source: 7 to 9% based on UN data and 10 to 18% based on IMF data. The OECD (Audet, 2002) has estimated the value of government procurement in OECD countries to be roughly 9% of GDP.
2 More recently Fronk (2015a) found that the average procurement market size represent 8.7% of GDP across 48 countries over 1990-2010 with System of National Accounts (SNA) data and 13.6% across 67 countries over the same period using national sources.
Attempts to estimate the size of national procurement markets have taken one of two approaches: a top-down method based on the SNA or a bottom-up method incorporating data drawn directly from national authorities. The majority of studies rely on SNA data and restrict their estimates to relatively brief time periods. When estimating procurement, it is important to differentiate between tradable and nontradable procurement. Tradable government procurements includes the provision of goods and services that can be readily supplied across national borders. This includes goods (such as machines, tools or airplanes) and services (such as project consulting or construction management) and it excludes from procurement the compensation of employees.
The SNA does not include a specific measurement of procurement spending, so this value must be estimated based on other SNA series. The two most pertinent series are Intermediate Consumption (IC) and Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF). IC consists of gross consumption spending on goods and services, whereas GFCF represents government expenditure on investment in new physical capital. An approximation of total procurement is the sum of IC and GFCF and this measurement is defined as 'standard GP' for the remainder of this study.
As part of its Government at a Glance statistics, the OECD uses OECD-National accounts Statistics and defines GP as the sum of IC, GFCF and also social transfers in kind (ST). This ST component contains purchases by general government of goods and services produced by market producers and supplied to households. However this series is usually only found in the National Accounts Statistics of OECD countries, therefore using this definition would restrict the coverage of the analysis. For the rest of the study this measurement will be called 'tradable GP'. None of those measures include State Owned enterprises (SOEs) nor Public Private Partnerships (PPPs).
Alternately, Kono (2010, 2014) and Fronk (2015a) use government spending on goods and services, and exclude defence spending (DF) which is generally restricted to domestic suppliers and a handful of close military allies 3 . They define therefore what they call "contestable procurement" and consider that defence procurement, which tends to be domestically oriented for national-security reasons, lies outside the scope of non-discrimination provisions included in procurement agreements. 4 The authors obtain those data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, although the original source is the International Monetary Fund's Government Finance Statistics (GFS) which allows a slightly larger sample.
Audet (2002) also estimates the size of procurement markets in over 130 countries, based on 1998 data.
3.
While it is true that within the group of pre-qualified firms contracts are often awarded through competitive bidding the exigencies of defence considerations make non-discriminatory processes unsuitable for defence spending.
4.
The lack of reliable procurement statistics makes it difficult to assess the level of defence procurement included under international agreements. For example, the importance of defence procurement reported by parties to the Government Procurement Agreement differs by party, ranging from less than 1% to more than 80% of above-threshold procurement. Additionally, a lack of clarity exists about whether 'above-threshold procurement' includes defence procurement that is discriminatory due to national security exemptions. This lack of clarity makes it harder to assess how much defence procurement is covered under international agreements.
However, it must be noted that for social transfers in kind 5 the DF series is not available for all countries in the sample.
In this section, the size of GP markets is calculated for the maximum number of countries using SNA data or GFS data (and not data from national authorities because a lack of available data limits the coverage). SNA data has been collected for 71 countries and data from the GFS covers 89 countries 6 . The trend in GP size over 1995-2011 is presented in Figure 1 , under three different measurements, the standard GP using exclusively IC and GFC components that are available for all countries, the tradable GP adding social transfer in kind 7 (ST) and the contestable GP excluding defence spending (DF).
Both data sources deliver the same messages. First there have been two increases in GP size, one around 2000-2002 and a more significant over 2008-2010 in response to the financial crisis.
8 Second, adding social transfers in kind (ST) increases considerably the size of GP, from 8-9% to 11-13% (although this series is not available for all countries). Third, excluding defence spending decreases significantly the amount of contestable GP, by 2 percentage points on average. Overall, different measurements produce different levels of GP but the evolution over the years is not that much affected by the choice of the measurement, in either IC or GFCF. 
5.
Social transfers in kind consist of individual goods and services provided as transfers in kind to individual households by government, examples can include social security benefits, social assistance benefits, or transfers of individual non-market goods or services.
6.
Note that China is not included as the lack of government statistics for China makes it difficult to provide estimates.
7.
Social transfers in kind are included in OECD definition of government procurement. In theory they could be possibly tradable (i.e. provided by a foreign supplier). However it should be noted that they do not fall under the scope of the GPA or preferential trade agreements.
8.
The share of GP in GDP could increase during a recession because of three reasons. First the level of GDP could fall, procurement spending could increase, or a combination of both. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the average estimated size of GP markets between 2006-2011, first for 71 countries based on SNA data, using the tradable measurement and then for 89 countries based on GFS data. The mean is around 9% of GDP, which is similar to the other studies mentioned above that drew on international data sources; 9 however the ranking may differ from one source to another. A high ratio is found for Netherlands, similar to that found in the OECD Governance at a Glance reports, because of the ST component. Israel, Georgia, Yemen and United States have a lower GP size if defence spending is excluded. Table 1 . Different estimates of the size of GP market
Footnote by Turkey
The information in this document with reference to "Cyprus" relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the "Cyprus" issue. 9. 8.7% in Fronk (2015a) , 7-9% in Trionfetti (2000) and in Audet (2002) . The second main observation is that with GFS data the GP size tends to be very low for some developing countries and one can assume that some amounts are missing in this series; hence Komo and Rickard (2014) when using those GFS data estimate an average GP size of 4. 4% over 1990-2008 for 138 countries. This is why the remainder of the study uses SNA data to calculate the size of GP markets. Furthermore, the definition adopted for the remainder of the study is the standard definition of GP (IC+GFCF) since information on social transfers (ST) and Defence (DF) are missing for several developing countries in SNA data.
Domestic bias in Government Procurement
Measuring domestic bias in government procurement is difficult. Looking at the text of law is unhelpful because domestic bias is typically not explicit: except when it is institutionalised, the home bias is not directly observable for it is usually the result of tacit discriminatory behaviour not codified in written rules or it can be the result of procurement procedures that unintentionally impede foreign firms from applying or winning contract awards. Further, even when domestic bias is explicit, its impact on the procurement market cannot be found by simply reading the regulations.
The existence of explicitly discriminatory policies, like price preferences, are often considered as proof of protectionism-after all, governments explicitly prefer domestic over foreign suppliers. The actual economic effect of domestic bias can depend on the market structure and the size of government demand for the product in question. Thus, a price-preference policy, while conceptually similar to an import tariff, is unlikely to show the same effects as a tariff, because a tariff gives preferential treatment to the domestic producer across all purchasers, while a procurement price preference applies only to government purchases, which can be offset by an increase in imports by the private sector (Evenett and Hoekman, 2013) .
Detailed information on offers submitted in and conduct of the tendering process would also be important in analysing discrimination in government procurement-governments that consistently choose higher-priced domestic bids might be guilty of discrimination. Despite the WTO GPA's efforts to enhance the transparency of relevant data, such information is not widely available. 10 The recent OECD taxonomy displayed in Gourdon et al. (2017) is the first step to start collecting such information. Scholars attempting to measure discrimination across a wide range of countries have thus turned to outcome-based measures, using imports. This is the approach adopted in this study: first, with a method which compares the propensity to buy national between the public and the private sector; and then with a method which looks at the impact on imports of a shift from private spending to public spending via public procurement.
Comparing the government's propensity to import with that of the private sector
This method entails comparing the import share of governments with that of the private sector.
11 If the import share is lower for governments, and is large and diffused across all categories of purchase, then it could suggest some type of discriminatory policy. A comparison of this nature depends on the use of data on unbiased imports. Trionfetti (2000) suggests the use of households' or firms' import shares as "their expenditure is driven by profit and utility maximisation and, likely, is not affected by any sort of discriminatory behaviour." Trionfetti follows such an approach and finds evidence to suggest that government purchases are home biased. Thus, a systematic comparison between import shares of the government and of the private economy is a promising method for investigating the presence of discriminatory behaviour.
10.
Collecting such information across a wide range of countries is beyond the scope of this paper.
11.
Here the import share is the ratio of the value of foreign purchases to the value of total purchases
The main drawback of Trionfetti (2000) is that it examined only a handful of OECD countries in a single year during the eighties using Eurostat data. This study adopts Trionfetti's approach using Input- Output Tables from GTAP  12 to compute those import shares for public and private sectors for 50 countries. GTAP reports government purchases and government imports by country for four years, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2011 . However, given that GTAP is a harmonised data source and the different years cannot be treated as independent observations, this exercise can only give indicative results. As such, these estimates do not necessarily capture discriminatory behaviour but simply a bias, unintentional or not, toward home consumption. This bias could be natural given that GP spending may be more heavily weighted towards non-tradable items than private sector spending --although this approach aims to control for differences in consumption bundles between public and private sectors by dropping all consumption of public administration, health, and education services, which by definition are more prominent in public expenditure and less tradable. 13 We also compare the ratio at the broad sector level (agriculture, mining, manufacturing and services) to account for differences in consumption bundles between private and public sectors.
We estimate the propensity to import of the private sector (PI i priv ), and the propensity to import of the public sector (PI i ub ) as the share of imports in total purchases:
Then the ratio of those import shares is calculated as: Figure 2 shows the distribution of the ratio of public to private import share across the 50 countries and four sectors (agriculture, mining, manufacturing and services) in the dataset (after excluding consumption of public services and normalising the ratio 14 ), and the median of this distribution (line). These ratios are in general below 1, indicating that the government's propensity to import is below that of the private sector. This is normal since the public sector is more inclined to buy non-tradeable products and services 15 . Using Eurostat data Trionfetti (2001) also found ratios below one, (between 0.27 and 0.78). The data, while subject to some limitations, provide evidence that the import share of governments is systematically lower than the import share of the private economy. It is plausible that this is a reflection of the presence of some form of government bias in favour of domestically produced products. But more importantly, there is a slight declining trend over the years and especially between 2001 (for which the mean, not reported, is 0.686) and 2011 (with a mean over the same countries of 0.621) suggesting that "domestic bias" as approximated by this approach is growing in importance over this period. The median line on the figure also shows this slight declining trend with a value of 0.67 in 2001 and 0.55 in 2011. Annex 1 shows the distribution of ratios estimated at the detailed sector level (for the 34 sectors); the resulting figure is messier because it includes values at the extremes, but it allows for better control for differences in consumption bundles. Results and conclusion remain unchanged.
12.
One must keep in mind that GTAP data are reconstructed data. It should be noted, therefore, that using partially 'reconstructed data' to estimate procurement discrimination may bias results. However, Fontagne et al (2013) used the GTAP data to estimate tariff equivalent of protection in services and found plausible results. In addition, we only use data for the 50 countries considered as most reliable in their output-input matrix (mostly developed economies).
13.
Hence we compare the consumption of private and public sectors solely in goods and private services (excluding consumption of the public services sector).
14.
In some cases the ratio could be extremely large and such large numbers exert a disproportionate influence on sector averages.
15.
GTAP also provides figures at the product level, but the information is heavily constructed and very different from actual figures, suggesting that GTAP data is not well suited to this methodology.
It appears that domestic bias in public spending is more common in developed economies, although developing countries are becoming increasingly biased. Figure 3 shows the change for developed and developing countries in this ratio between 2004 and 2011 (for a sample of 118 countries) compared to their initial ratio in 2004 (blue triangles and red dots respectively). The bias toward internal purchases (of which we assume some is due to discrimination) seems larger in developed countries (most of the developed countries are below 0.60 on the x-axis) while a significant number of developing countries show a higher ratio. However, the reduction in this ratio is slightly more pronounced for developing countries (below the zero line on the y-axis), which could indicate that home bias in measures taken in response to the global economic crisis occurred marginally more in the developing regions. Note: The figure shows the distribution of the ratio of public to private imports across each country. The bottom line reflects the minimum ratio, the bottom of the box represents the first quartile (or 25 th percentile), the line in the box is the median (or 50 th percentile), the top of the box is the third quartile (or 75 th percentile), and the top line represents the maximum ratio in each year.
Source: Authors' calculations based on GTAP.
Figure 2. Change in ratio public to private propensity to import over 2004-2011
Note: Developed countries: blue dots, Developing: red dots.
Assessing the effect of public spending on imports
Another method to approximate home-bias in government procurement is to estimate the impact of procurement spending (measured as the value of GP) on the imports of goods and services, controlling for other factors (see Annex 1) . The basic assumption is that the relationship between spending and imports allows for conclusions related to procurement discrimination. The dependent variable is the country's imports of goods and services, expressed as a percentage of GDP. The key independent variable is the country's procurement, also as a percentage of GDP. The proposition is that the procurement coefficient indicates the government's propensity to spend procurement funds on imported rather than domestic goods and services.
Before hypotheses regarding the spending coefficient can be posed, it is necessary to understand how procurement spending changes total demand for imports. As noted by Kono and Rickard (2014) , an increase in procurement shifts spending from the private to the public sector -government uses tax revenues from the private sector to meet government objectives. How this changes total imports depends on the level of discrimination in the procurement market.
The estimated procurement coefficients should range from zero to negative, with larger negative coefficients suggesting higher levels of domestic bias, assuming the private sector does not discriminate. This approach, however, does not account for the fact that public spending could be more oriented toward non-tradable expenditures. A coefficient of zero would mean that an increase in procurement has no impact on imports, implying there is no home bias at all. If, however, the coefficient is negative and closer to -1, then this could imply that the government favours domestic producers, and an increase in procurement shifts spending from a non-discriminatory private sector to a discriminatory government. In that instance, procurement spending would lower imports. These results should be treated cautiously, however, as even when including only intermediate consumption and investment in the estimates of GP, the estimates may still capture more than pure discrimination with this method. Substantively, these results indicate that a one percentage point increase in the share of procurement in GDP reduces the share of imports in GDP by an average of 0.82%. This means that, on average, increasing the share of procurement in GDP by one standard deviation (3.6 percentage points) should reduce the share of imports in GDP by around 2.9 percentage points. Those 2.9 percentage points iare around one-tenth of a standard deviation across countries of the share of imports in GDP (i.e. 26% in the sample). Hence the results do not indicate that procurement discrimination explains the bulk of variation in trade openness in the context of procurement spending that amounts, on average, to 9.7% of GDP in the sample over 1995-2011. This analysis attempts to measure the government's propensity to discriminate against imports relative to domestic private consumers. As noted earlier, a procurement spending coefficient of zero implies that the government is not more home biased than the private sector. Hence the transfer of purchasing power from private to public hands has no effect on imports. At the other extreme, a procurement spending coefficient of -1.0 implies that the government discriminates completely: the government spends nothing on imports, so any transfer of money from private to public hands results in an equally large fall in imports. Viewed from this perspective, an average procurement spending coefficient of -0.82 seems like a large effect. For every dollar that the private sector spends on imports, governments spend only 18 cents, and the remaining 82 cents goes to domestic producers. Put differently, any amount that the government taxes and spends- 16 .
Column 1, Table A1 .1, presents general results on the effect of GP spending on import spending, Column 2 shows how the trend of this effect evolved over 1995-2011. Columns 3 and 4 replicate but disaggregate the effect between developed and developing countries. again, on goods and services that can in principle be imported-reduces imports by over half that amount. This would appear to suggest domestic bias in public procurement. How much this domestic bias affects trade depends, of course, on how much a given government taxes and spends.
This home bias effect increases throughout the sample period, by 6.4% each year. Figure 4 shows interesting insights on the heterogeneity in this relationship: the home bias is more pronounced in developed economies with a coefficient of approximately -1 (-97%) implying that the government discriminates completely, while the home bias is significantly less in developing countries (-66%). Results also indicate that discrimination is becoming more severe in both regions, by 6.6% and 6% respectively, similar to the conclusion drawn from the previous approach (when comparing propensity to import) in Figure 3 . Figure 5 below, shows the interaction in the estimation of year fixed effects with the GP/GDP series, which permits identification of this declining trend year by year. There is an increase in discrimination, over the 2000-2004 and 2007-2011 periods. For developing countries, it seems that home bias in government expenditures was not large before the end of the nineties, which might reflect a more limited number of sufficiently large local suppliers at that stage, and potentially also a part of procurement in public infrastructure financed under international loans. Using the share of imports in government expenditure to identify whether barriers to trade exist in countries' public procurement should, however, be interpreted cautiously. First, the goods and services that governments procure are likely to have a higher proportion of non-tradeable products than those of the private sector, meaning that some bias toward national sourcing is normal. Second, national companies can win competitive procurement processes against foreign companies in a fair way; procurement settings between public and private sectors are different; and local companies are by definition better placed for certain types of works and services (e.g. cleaning services and construction works). These issues should not be seen as artificially favouring national companies over foreigners. 
Development and incidence of GPAs and Procurement Discipline in Agreements (PDAs)
Market access is one of the main rationales for negotiating disciplines on government procurement in international trade agreements (Hoekman, 2015) . Other rationales include preventing discriminatory procurement practices and agreeing transparent procurement rules between parties. These agreements are designed to guarantee foreign firms the right to tender for procurement contracts, and to be treated no differently from domestic firms in those processes.
The WTO GPA has developed in a number of ways since it first entered into force in 1996, particularly through regular expansions in national commitments. Membership of the agreement is one area where growth was more limited initially, although faster growth in membership is being witnessed since the entry into force of the revised GPA. The GPA is a plurilateral agreement, with voluntary membership. Approximately three-quarters of the WTO members do not participate, and those that do are mostly OECD member countries. Currently there are 19 parties to the agreement, representing 47 WTO members. The EU and its 28 member states represent 29 of the current members, in total, 31 OECD members are parties to the GPA. 17 The integration of the European Economic Community into the EU has contributed significantly to the growth in GPA membership since 1996 (Hoekman, 2015) . That said, there are currently 30 observers to the GPA, 10 of which are in the process of accession 18 .
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are increasingly including provisions on procurement and have become the preferred path to extend procurement rules to non-GPA members (Hoekman, 2015) . These PTAs match the GPA in terms of providing liberalisation on a preferential basis, where the market opening is restricted to parties of each agreement. Prior to 1990, there existed seven international agreements covering government procurement: six bilateral agreements with procurement disciplines (PDA) plus the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). In 2000, this number had risen to twenty agreements. However, by 2010, there were closer to seventy bilateral GP agreements (as notified to the WTO, Figure 6 ). As new agreements formed and existing agreements added members, the number of trading relationships governed by PDA has exploded.
PTAs with GP provisions tend to be between parties to the WTO GPA. 19 An analysis of 60 PTAs suggests that more than 78% of those agreements involve at least one party to the GPA. Only 13 of the 60 agreements reviewed were between parties with no WTO GPA commitments (see black lines, Figure 7 ). 20 Ueno (2013) reviewed the provisions of 47 OECD member PTAs with both coverage commitments and detailed provisions on procurement rules. Each member's commitments in terms of entities covered appear similar across their agreements, especially for central government and other entities. Some of the other entities were included on a reciprocal basis; this was the dominant approach for commitments on the coverage of sub-central government entities. The difficulty of making commitments for sub-central government entities is reflected in the fact that such commitments are included in only about half of the PTAs. The vast majority of the thresholds included in the PTAs of GPA parties are at least at the same level as thresholds under the GPA, while there were a small number of "below GPAs" thresholds.
17.
Australia, Chile, and Turkey are observers to the agreement. Mexico is the only OECD country that is neither a party nor an observer to the agreement.
18.
These are: Albania, Australia, China, Georgia, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Oman, Tajikistan and the Russian Federation. Six other members have undertaken commitments in their WTO accession protocols to initiate accession to the GPA: Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
19.
The sequencing can vary, however. In some cases, countries may have concluded FTAs covering GP prior to acceding to the GPA. Ueno (2013) as well as the expanded coverage from this analysis are detailed in Annexes 4 and 5. An additional 13 agreements were identified from the WTO PTA database using the same parameters as Ueno (2013) although also including non-OECD members. 21 The provisions in these agreements support Ueno's initial findings. There is little variation in coverage across a party's agreements for its central government entities, although the number of schedules with commitments in sub-central coverage is slightly greater, with approximately 60% including at least some sub-central entities. 22 Other entities are covered in all but one of the schedules. The thresholds in these new agreements appear to be negotiated on a reciprocal basis, and are closely related to those agreed in each country's existing agreements.
This analysis expands on Ueno (2013). Details of the agreements covered in
Do government procurement provisions in trade agreements reduce domestic bias?
The impact of international procurement rules on discrimination is assessed using the methodology developed by Rickard and Kono (2014) . The elasticity of imports to procurement spending is estimated, while controlling for other determinants of imports. The impact of both multilateral and preferential procurement agreements on these import procurement elasticities is then estimated. A summary results table is provided below, while full results in Table A2 .1 and more details of the methodology are provided in Annex 2. 23 Overall it seems that the GPA has a significant impact on reducing home bias in government procurement. This confirms earlier results, albeit using a different approach, from Chen and Walley (2011) . Moreover, Anderson et al. (2011) note that some 25% of recent PTAs include GPA like disciplines and that they mostly involve countries that are not GPA members. One interpretation of this observation is that PTAs can be seen as a form of de facto multilateralisation of the GPA, especially as in practice market access concessions in the GPA are negotiated and applied (on a preferential basis) bilaterally. However, whether the inclusion of procurement disciplines in PTAs has any impact on outcomes is an empirical matter -there is little research evidence to date suggesting a significant economic impact .
The results from this analysis do not indicate a significant effect from procurement disciplines in PTAs (PDA) in reducing procurement discrimination. While subject to some data and methodological limitations, this result could reflect the relatively shallow commitments in most of PDAs-they either simply reflect the prevailing status quo in procurement policy for signatories or limit commitments to best endeavour-type (non-binding, non-enforceable) language. Clearly much depends on each agreement's level of ambition. The recent Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the EU is an example of a PTA that should have a major impact on opening up Canadian procurement markets to EU firms (Hoekman, 2015) .
The role of investment agreements
Many of the purchases by government entities comprise services or products where economic forces favour suppliers with a local presence. In such cases, procurement will only be discriminatory if foreign firms cannot contest the market through FDI, or if government entities differentiate among firms on the basis of their nationality. FDI barriers are costly to the economy as a whole, and policy efforts that focus on eliminating such barriers are likely to have a greater payoff than attempting to outlaw discrimination. International investment agreements are one option for countries to eliminate barriers to FDI.
21.
These additional 13 agreements were signed by Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, the European Union, Georgia, Korea, New Zealand, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Singapore, and Uruguay. They included 25 schedules, taking the total number of agreements to 60.
22.
Of course sub-central coverage can reflect a variety of factors, including governmental structure (whether a unitary or federal state) and size of the economy.
23.
Coefficients are not often significant, indicating that agreements are not very influential, and the sign can differ depending on the method of measurement. Both of these factors underscore the need for caution in interpreting the results from this approach.
In theory, barriers to firm entry and exit are a key determinant of the welfare effects of discriminatory procurement practices (Evenett and Hoekman, 2005) . In the absence of such barriers, local preference may lead to an expansion of local output as new firms (potentially including foreign firms) enter the market. This means that, in general, the impact of government procurement discrimination would be contingent on national competition policy. Recent empirical support for this theory found that anticompetitive practices such as regulatory protection of incumbent firms and barriers to FDI have significant negative impact on the probability of a cross-border award (Kutlina-Dimitrova and Lakatos, 2016) .
The analysis presented in Table 2 below suggests that the GPA reduces home bias in general and even more when signatory countries also have international investment disciplines. This sustains the assumption that part of procurement discrimination is focused on local economic activity, rather than national versus foreign firms. 
The potential of better data
Finally, a finer analysis of home bias in government procurement can be obtained using award-level data, which allows for a richer assessment of home bias determinants than the use of trade flows as a proxy. However such data are not widely available.
VVA consulting/London Economics (2017) reports figures using such award-level data on crossborder procurement above EU thresholds (based on Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) dataset), At the central and sub-central level, the share of cross border contracts ranging from 1.5% to 2% per year (see Figure 8) . The share of direct cross-border contract value is found to be significantly higher, ranging 2.5% in 2009 to 3.5% in 2015.
In addition to the European Union, we include a review of similar studies for the US (although only at the federal level), Japan, and Switzerland. Fronk (2015b) drew on US data from the US Federal Procurement Data System and Shingal (2015) used data from two signatories of GPA, Japan and Switzerland, which more consistently report their contract awards covered under GPA.
US figures, at the federal level only, have been estimated by Fronk (2015b) . As seen in Figure 9 below, until 2007, foreign firms were awarded less than 1% of procurement contracts. Only in the final few years of the sample did foreign firms begin to increase their share. By 2010, foreign firms secured almost 3% of all contracts and 4% of all spending (as measured by the total value of contracts). Firms from countries with a PDA received the bulk of foreign-awarded procurement over the length of the dataset. The preference in favour of partners to these agreements is clear, but the question of the counter-factual remains; that is, would they have received the same outcome without the agreement? Fronk (2015b) 24 finds that signing PDA agreements with the US increased a partner's probability of success by 174%, however these gains come primarily from trade diversion (i.e. gains taken from other non-US companies).
24.
Fronk (2015b) used a probit selection model with two steps approach. Figures reported by Shingal (2015) for Japan and Switzerland end in 2003 so a probable rising trend since 2005 could not be observed. Japan is one exception, as the average share of contracts won by foreign firms is higher than the average value indicating that contracts won by foreign suppliers are of a smaller than average value (Figure 10) . 25 Recent statistics provided by the Government Procurement and Competition Policy Group of the WTO Secretariat (IPD) will allow extension of the series for Japan.
Using a commonly used metric in the procurement literature -a comparison of the foreign share of purchases of a given product by government with that of the private sector (see Francois, Nelson, and Palmeter, 1997) , Shingal (2011) finds that, for similar categories of services, the Japanese government purchased less from foreign suppliers, Figure 10 shows that the share of value and awards to foreign supplier in goods and services is somewhat similar in 2011 to those in Figures 9 and 8 for the United States and European Union respectively over the same period, and slightly below the levels in the pre-global economic crisis period. A contribution of this study is to use a novel award-level public procurement dataset to investigate the effect of public procurement agreements on market access. This is the EC Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) dataset, which covers cross border procurement award notices in the European Union for the period 2009-2014, based on the requirement to publish public procurement data on TED. 26 In the European Union, the share of direct cross-border contracts increased in recent years.
27 Over 2009-2014, the EC TED data set includes almost 4 000 cross-border awards per year. Analysis of the EC dataset focuses on three key questions.
28 Does GPA membership increase the chances of a country's firms being successful in the EU 25. Japan is among the few GPA countries who consistently report statistics.
26.
Observations without any information on the value of the award (around 30% of the contracts), or on the nationality of the selected firm as well as observations with a total award value below EUR 1 000 and above EUR 200 million were removed.
27.
Here, direct cross border contracts covers only direct cross-border public procurement contracts and does not specifically include the international procurement through domestic commercial presence. Therefore, it excludes public contracts won across the EU by domestic subsidiaries of foreign firms in Europe.
28
. Details on the model and estimations as well as complete tables of results are given in Annex 2. The questions are answered with the help of the public procurement award notices in the EU for the period 2009-2014, for which the methodology is detailed in Annex 3. The period does not allow then to estimate the positive effect of the GPA before 2009 when most of the important signatory countries joined the GPA; therefore the results presented below must be taken with caution. Table 3 summarises the results of the estimation and shows that the GPA has a greater impact on foreign awards than PDAs, which are found to have no effect on cross-border procurement. However the non-significant impact of PDAs partly reflects the fact that there are relatively few PTAs that include procurement disciplines between EU and non-EU countries.
29
A country's membership of the GPA increases the probability of their firms being awarded a procurement contract in the EU, through the cross-border mode of supply. However, GPA membership does not change the total tradable procurement nor the total procurement awarded through the cross-border mode of supply. Instead, as a preferential trade agreement, the GPA redistributes the share of total value amongst cross-border suppliers, favouring GPA members. This suggests that while foreign suppliers may win a greater share of available contracts, the procurement pie is not expanding--the number of available procurement contracts may not increase just because a country has signed the GPA. This approach does not allow to capture other potential gains from GPA such as i) enhanced competition in procurement markets, leading to improved value for money ii) good governance, i.e. enhanced integrity through transparency and fair procedures and iii) encouraging inward foreign direct investment through a commitment to transparent and non-discriminatory rules.
Finally the results provide further evidence that FDI barriers reduce the effectiveness of the GPA and PDA in increasing the chance of a cross-border award. 30 The output here is direct cross-border procurement so we do not capture how FDI restrictions would impede access to GP through local presence of foreign firms but mostly how FDI restrictiveness would impede foreign firms to comply with requirement such as merger with national supplier. In the same vein the relevance of GPA also on participation by locally established affiliates of international suppliers in procurements in light of its Article IV:2 is not captured by this estimation. Indeed contracts won in this fashion will not show as "cross border procurement" in trade statistics and are therefore not taken into consideration in the analysis summarized in Table 3 . This suggests that to maximise the gains from GPA accession, a country should also undertake investment liberalisation. 
29.
That said, PDAs do increase partners' share of awards within all government procurement awards, just not the share of cross-border awards, or the share of non-EU cross-border awards.
30.
The FDI restrictiveness indicator used in the model is drawn from the OECD Product Market Regulation database.
Conclusion
This study collects new information, to present, in one place, an updated picture of the size of government procurement markets, and how these have been evolving. It also draws on current methods to provide evidence of the level of discrimination in government procurement markets, and the efficiency of government procurement agreements in reducing those levels of discrimination.
The size of government procurement markets is estimated to be between, on average, 11% and 12% of GDP in 2011 and the share of procurement in GDP has been increasing gradually since 1995, with clear spikes during 2000-2002 and 2008-2010 , the latter in response to the global economic crisis.
Evidence suggests that there is domestic bias in government procurement markets, and this bias has been increasing over recent years. Biased procurement is more pronounced in developed economies, though procurement in developing economies has become increasingly more biased since 2000.
The effectiveness of international government procurement agreements in reducing home-bias is mixed. Accession to the WTO's GPA reduces discrimination in procurement markets, increasing trade among members to the agreement (but not necessarily increasing overall procurement trade). Available evidence at this stage indicates no significant effect in reducing domestic bias from bilateral agreements, by themselves. Joining the GPA appears to be the most efficient strategy in the absence of deeper procurement disciplines in other trade agreements.
Liberalisation of investment barriers undertaken in parallel with trade agreements, however, increases the ability of those agreements to reduce discrimination. The effect of the GPA in reducing discrimination is greater in economies with low barriers to FDI, while trade agreements that include investment provisions enable those agreements to reduce home bias. This suggests that countries negotiating procurement agreements could also benefit from negotiating investment agreements in parallel.
This study benefited from access to an EC award-level procurement dataset which resulted in richer analysis of, particularly, the effectiveness of procurement agreements on trade in procurement. By the nature of the dataset, the story that the data tells is EU-centric, but it does illustrate the value of developing and analysing datasets of this type. Access to similar datasets from other countries would extend the analysis and allow for powerful insights and policy recommendations to be realised.
Annex 1. Estimation of Home-Bias in Government Procurement
Figure below shows the distribution of the ratio of public to private import share for 50 countries but for 34 sectors in the dataset (after excluding public administration, health, education and defence spending, and normalising the ratio), which allows comparison of the same types of spending and controls more effectively for differences in spending bundles. These ratios are still in general below 1, although there are more extreme values, above 1.5 or close to the zero line. The data still show clearly that the import share of governments is systematically lower than the import share of the private economy (although this may also reflect the lesser role of tradables government procurement). We still observe a slight declining trend over the years and especially between 2001 (for which the mean, not reported, is 0.478) and 2011 (with a mean over the countries of 0.392) suggesting that "discrimination" approximated by this approach is more and more important over this period. The median line on the figure shows a slighter declining trend with a value of 0.11 in 2001 and 0.09 in 2011. Again most of those extreme values need to be taken with a great deal of caution since GTAP are constructed data, and we rely more on values at the broad sector level (Agriculture, Mining, Industry and Services) as in Figure 2 (page 11).
A simple approach developed by Kono and Rickard (2014) is adopted: The impact of procurement spending on imports is estimated, controlling for other gravity factors (size, GDP, GDP-weighted distance, tariff and number of trade agreement signed by the country) in an OLS regression. The dependent variable, Imports/GDPi,t is country i's imports of goods and services in year t, expressed as a percentage of GDP. The key independent variable, GP/GDPi,t, is i's contestable procurement spending (including defense and excluding social transfers in kind) in year t, also as a percentage of GDP. Ceteris paribus, the procurement coefficient indicates the government's propensity to spend procurement funds on imported rather than domestic goods and services. Year fixed effects are included. Overall the sample covers the period 1995-2012 and comprises 72 countries (35 developed and 37 developing). 
Annex 2. Estimating the Efficiency of Procurement Agreements
Following Rickard and Kono (2014) the impact of international agreements on the elasticity of imports of goods to procurement spending is observed. A bilateral gravity model of imports between country i and country j is used with controls that either theory or previous research suggests should influence imports (Size, GDP, tariff and existence of trade agreements between countries) and the level of procurement spending.
To answer the question, two interaction terms are included: ln(Procurementit)*GPAijt and ln(Procurementit)*PDAijt. These are interactions, respectively, between procurement spending and dummy variables for joint membership in the WTO GPA and signing a Procurement discipline agreements PDAs. Both dummies are coded 1 if countries i and j belong to the given procurement agreement and 0 otherwise. If these agreements reduce discrimination, the elasticity of imports to procurement spending will be higher among the signatories, and the coefficient on the interactions will be positively signed. Conversely, a small and insignificant coefficient would imply that PDAs or GPA do not discourage discrimination in public procurement.
The existence of a joint Procurement and Investment Agreement and joint GPA membership and Investments Disciplines are also included, in order to account for the reinforced effects of procurement disciplines in the agreement where investment liberalisation provisions are also included. Here again a positive sign is expected on the interaction of efficiency is there.
The specification follows the most recent robust techniques developed (in Head and Mayer 2014 31 ): we use a PPML (Poisson) estimator to account for zero value in bilateral trade and we include exporter and year fixed effects. Since our interest variable (share of GP in GDP) is importer-year specific we cannot include importer-year fixed effects but an index of remoteness is used, as in Helliwell (1998) 3233 , and standards errors are clustrered at importer-year level. And standard gravity variables are included such as common border, common language and colonial relationship 
33.
One could not use importer-year dummies which is the first best option because one of the main explanatory variable is importer year specific and would have been the dropped from the estimations, this is why one had to rely on this second best option 
Annex 3. Estimating the Efficiency of Procurement Agreements Using EC award data
The econometric analysis here is based on recent studies by Kutlina-Dimitrova and Lakatos (2016), Shinghal (2015) and Fronk (2015b) . The impact of a set of selected explanatory variables on the probability of awarding public procurement contracts directly cross-border is estimated. The response variables are alternately the share of a country j in the number of contracts awarded and the value of awards in a reporting EU country i. Consecutively the share in total award, the share in total awards to foreign companies and the share of awards to foreign and non-EU companies are used.
Dummies are included if the reporting i and partner j countries are both in the GPA or have signed an agreement with procurement disciplines (PDA) to assess the efficiency of such agreements. Following the assumption of Kutlina-Dimitrova and Lakatos (2016) the OECD index of restrictiveness to FDI in reporter i from the Product Market Regulation database (PMRfdi) is also included and this is interacted with GPA.
Variables are included that control for awarding country characteristics found in Shinghal (2015) or Fronk (2015b) such as GDP of of reporter, size of public procurement market (GP) in reporter i, and Import to GdP ratio of reporter i, government expenditure to GDP ratio. And standard gravity variables are included such as common border, common language and colonial relationship.
The specification follow the most recent robust techniques developed (in Head and Mayer 2014 34 ): we use a PPML (Poisson) estimator to account for zero value in bilateral cross border flows and we include exporter-year fixed effects. Since our interest variable (PMR index) is importer-year specific we cannot include importer-year fixed effects but an index of remoteness is used, as in Helliwell (1998) 
EU-Georgia European Union
2002 covered (GPA or wider GPS) covered (GPA or wider GPS) covered (GPA or wider GPS) covered (GPA or wider GPS)
EU-Georgia Georgia
2002 covered (Under process) covered (Under process) covered (Under process) covered (Under process)
EU -Korea European Union
2011 GPA94= (by reference) GPA94= (by reference) GPA94= (by reference) GPA94= (by reference) Entities having activities in the fields of airports and urban transport are not covered.
EU -Korea Korea
EU -Mexico European Union
2000 GPA94= not covered not covered GPA94= 
EU -Mexico Mexico
EFTA -Canada Switzerland
2009 GPA= (by reference) GPA= (by reference) GPA= (by reference) GPA= (by reference) Entities having activities in the fields of water, electricity, ports, airports, urban transport are not covered vis-à-via Canada.
EFTA -Canada Canada
2009 GPA= (by reference) GPA= (by reference) not applied to Iceland and Liechtenstein GPA= (by reference) GPA= (by reference)
EFTA -Chile Iceland
2004 GPA94= GPA94 = GPA94 = GPA94 -entities having activities in electricity sector
EFTA -Chile Liechtenstein
EFTA -Chile Norway
EFTA -Chile Switzerland
EFTA -Chile Chile
2004 20 ministries 51 provinces in 13 regions (conditions for central government entities are applied)
341 municipalities + all other sub-central public entities + all other entities operating in the general interest and subject to effective and managerial or financial control by public entities.
10 entities (ports) + state owned airports
EFTAColombia Iceland
2011 GPA94= GPA94 = GPA94 = GPA94 -entities having activities in electricity sector
EFTAColombia Liechtenstein
EFTAColombia Norway
EFTAColombia Switzerland
EFTAColombia Colombia
2011
28 entities (including legislative and some judicial branches) all departments all municipalities
